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Preferential trading arrangements (PTA) can promote an export industry in the developing 
world to promote poverty reduction and sustainable development. Since preferential treatment 
requires export products to satisfy rules of origin (ROO), beneficiary exporters incur 
administrative costs in proving origin and additional costs for restrictive input sourcing. Prior 
works show that stringent ROO could discourage trade flows (Anson et al., 2005; Augier and 
Gasiorek, 2004; Brenton and Manchin, 2003; Conconi et al., 2018; de Melo and Portugal-Perez, 
2013; Estevadeordal and Suominen, 2004). However, origin-conferring criteria may be more 
restrictive on some beneficiary countries that rely largely on imported inputs, which may magnify 
their export expansion in response to the relaxation of stringent ROO in preferential treatment. 
Thus, it remains unclear whether ROO have heterogeneous impacts on beneficiaries’ exports. 
In this paper, we estimate the impact of ROO on exports in developing economies by 
examining ROO liberalization in European Union (EU) trade preferences. Specifically, the EU 
has long maintained a partnership with African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries and 
concluded Interim Economic Partnership Agreements (IEPA) in 2007. Meanwhile, the EU 
introduced the Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative in 2001 as part of the Generalized System 
of Preferences (GSP), while a new regulation on ROO in the GSP came into effect on January 1, 
2011.1 In these regimes, duty-free and quota-free access to the EU market was unchanged, 
whereas origin requirements for garment products were relaxed for IEPA beneficiaries after 2008 
and for EBA beneficiaries after 2011.2 Consequently, the share of imports into 28 EU member 
countries from these beneficiaries increased from 13.7% in 2005 to 26.6% in 2015 for knitted 
garments and from 6.8% in 2005 to 17.7% in 2015 for woven garments, respectively 
(EUROSTAT). 
Using these policy changes as a natural experiment, we assess the heterogeneous impacts of 
ROO liberalization on garment exports in developing economies. Specifically, we measure the 
impacts of ROO changes on exports in IEPA and EBA beneficiaries by exploiting four sources of 
variations in exports: (i) a difference between beneficiary and non-beneficiary exporters; (ii) a 
difference between EU importers and non-EU importers; (iii) a difference between garment 
products and non-garment products; and (ⅳ) a difference between pre- and post-periods. The 
specification allows us to disentangle a variety of confounding factors from the causal impact of 
ROO changes on garment exports in developing economies. We use trade data during the period 
2005-2015 from the UN Comtrade, as quotas on global garment trade were generally removed 
                                                   
1 For details, see Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1063/2010 of 18 November 2010 amending 
Regulation (EEC) No. 2454/93 laying down provisions for the implementation of Council Regulation 
(EEC) No. 2913/92 establishing the Community Customs Code. 
2 Stringent ROO pose a crucial issue for garment industries in developing economies, which can serve 
as an entry point of industrialization (Rhee, 1990; Fukunishi and Yamagata, 2014). 
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after the termination of the Multi Fibre Agreement regime in 2004. Our sample includes 199 
exporters and 180 importers for products in the Harmonized System (HS) chapters 61-67. 
Our key results are summarized as follows. First, ROO liberalization has little aggregate 
effect on garment exports in IEPA beneficiaries, but a positive impact on those in EBA 
beneficiaries. Specifically, simplified ROO significantly increased garment exports from EBA 
beneficiaries by 25% after 2011. We interpret this finding as suggesting that the previous ROO 
might not seriously constrain input sourcing for the IEPA beneficiaries, whereas the previous 
ROO might be more restrictive for the EBA beneficiaries. The difference in the previous ROO 
between ACP and GSP regimes may produce contrasting impacts between the IEPA and EBA 
beneficiaries. A key channel of positive ROO impacts is the use of competitively priced inputs 
imported from third markets. Second, we find that ROO impacts are significantly heterogeneous 
across beneficiaries. Only some African and Asian countries increased significantly garment 
exports to the EU market after ROO liberalization. The results of the heterogeneous supply 
responses are robust to the Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) estimation. To 
understand the underlying conditions of heterogeneous supply responses, we discuss the initial 
production base, investment climate, structural transformation, and economic shocks. 
This paper contributes to three branches of related literature. The first branch estimates a 
relationship between ROO and trade flows. One approach is to quantify the restrictiveness of 
ROO as a categorical index at the product-level and examine the relationship between ROO index 
and trade flows (Anson et al., 2005; Conconi et al., 2018; Estevadeordal and Suominen, 2004). 
Another approach is to examine the impact of cumulation rules such as the Pan-European 
Cumulation System on trade flows (Augier et al., 2004; Augier et al., 2005; Andersson, 2016). 
Additionally, Tanaka (2021) assesses the EU’s reform in GSP ROO on a beneficiary country 
using a similar approach, but focuses only on Cambodia. To the best of our knowledge, this paper 
provides the first empirical assessment of ROO changes in both IEPA and EBA regimes in a 
unified empirical framework. 
The second branch examines global production networks (GPN) and global value chains 
(GVC) in the textile and garment sectors (Gereffi, 1999; Fukunishi and Yamagata, 2014). A 
growing number of studies describe the production structure of garment sectors in Africa (Lall, 
2005; Phelps et al., 2009; Morris and Staritz, 2014), Asia (Uchikawa, 1998; Ramaswamy and 
Gereffi, 2000; Curran and Nadvi, 2015), and the Middle East (Azmeh and Nadvi, 2014). As 
reviewed in Curran et al. (2019), GPN/GVC studies show that liberal ROO can promote garment 
exports through access to imported fabric from third countries (Pickles et al., 2015). Since country 
case studies may overlook unsuccessful cases, we use data on global garment trade to demonstrate 
the heterogeneous impacts of liberal ROO across garment exporters. 
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The third branch discusses the underlying reasons for export successes and economic 
performance in Africa (Collier and Gunning, 1999; Morrissey, 2005; Easterly and Reshef, 2011). 
These explanations typically highlight trade costs, infrastructure, geography, governance, 
institutions, and idiosyncratic events. Prior works such as Mattoo et al. (2003), Frazer and Van 
Biesebroeck (2010), and Fontagné et al. (2010) discuss an important influence of PTA on African 
exports, but pay small attention on ROO in trade promotion. Given the complexity of ROO, 
Hoekman and Njinkeu (2017) suggest that existing research on ROO in Africa is mostly 
qualitative. In this respect, we empirically estimate the impact of ROO in EU trade preferences 
toward Africa and demonstrate that only some African countries responded to ROO liberalization. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a background for EU trade 
regimes in examination. Section 3 describes a theoretical hypothesis and an empirical model to 
assess the impact of ROO on garment exports, followed by a data description. Section 4 presents 
the estimation results. Section 5 discusses underlying conditions for heterogeneous ROO impacts. 
Finally, section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Background 
2.1.  Interim economic partnership agreements 
The EU had a partnership with ACP countries since the successive Lomé Conventions for the 
period 1975-2000 (Frisch, 2008). The Lomé system granted non-reciprocal preferences to a group 
of ACP countries. As the EU discriminated in favor of a particular group of developing economies 
against others, the Lomé system was not consistent with the international trading rules under 
GATT/WTO. During the Lomé Ⅳ, the EU obtained a first waiver to continue this discriminatory 
trading arrangement until 2007. Under the Cotonou Agreement since 2000, the EU sought to 
conclude a WTO-consistent trade regime in order to grant preferential access to the ACP countries. 
However, a trade regime such as a free trade agreement (FTA) requires that the ACP countries 
also liberalize market barriers to imports from the EU. Additionally, the EU sought to negotiate a 
broad range of issues such as services, which led to a delay in FTA negotiations. To meet the 
deadline, the EU first concluded an interim EPA (IEPA) by the end of 2007, and postponed further 
negotiations for a comprehensive EPA thereafter. 
Under the trade provisions of the Cotonou Agreement, most imports from ACP countries 
qualified for duty-free and quota-free access to the EU market. To prevent the loss of such 
preferential access, the EU agreed to offer the same preferential access to all the ACP countries 
that had initialed IEPAs after 2008 (Bilal and Stevens, 2009, chap. 2).3 Table 1 shows a list of 
countries that initialed the IEPA, who could then export to the EU market under the IEPA regime 
                                                   
3 Sugar and rice are an exception. 
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since 2008.4 Since some ACP countries did not initial the IEPA, they might start to export under 
other trade regimes. 
---Table 1 here--- 
The EU made some revision in ROO under the IEPA (Naumann, 2010). These include the 
origin requirements for textiles, clothing, and fish products. For clothing, ACP exporters had to 
perform a two-stage transformation under the Cotonou Agreement, whereas only a one-stage 
transformation was required under the IEPA regime. Thus, the EU liberalized the ROO for 
garment products from the ACP countries. 
 
2.2.  Everything But Arms 
The EU introduced the EBA initiative in 2001 to grant least developing countries (LDCs) 
duty-free and quota-free access for all tariff lines except for arms and ammunition (European 
Commission [EC], 2016).5 Table 1 shows a list of EBA beneficiaries as of August 2015. There 
are 49 EBA beneficiary, including 34 countries in Africa, 9 countries in Asia, and 6 countries in 
the Pacific and Caribbean area.6 Some ACP countries also belong to EBA beneficiaries so that 
they can export to the EU market under the EBA regime. Even if these ACP countries did not 
initial the IEPA by the end of 2007, they could export to the EU market under duty-free and quota-
free treatment after 2008. 
The EC adopted a new regulation on the ROO for EU GSP in November 2010. The new ROO 
came into effective on January 1, 2011.7 For instance, a two-stage transformation requirement 
for garment products was relaxed into one-stage transformation only for LDCs; i.e., fabric from 
any third market can be used to manufacture garment products for preferential access. 
 
2.3.  Origin requirements for garment products 
Since we focus on garment exports in developing economies, we summarize product-specific 
origin requirements for knitted and woven garment products in HS chapters 61 and 62. A key 
change in the new origin requirement is one-stage transformation. In the previous ROO, garment 
exporters must generally perform two processing stages, namely, fabric manufacture from yarn 
and garment manufacture from locally produced fabric. In the new ROO, exporters can use 
                                                   
4 The IEPA was signed in December 2014 by West African countries, except Nigeria, Mauritania, and 
Gambia. Mauritania later signed on September 21, 2018, and Gambia signed on August 9, 2018. 
5 Liberalization came into effect immediately except for gradual reductions to zero tariffs for bananas 
in 2006 and for rice and sugar in 2009. 
6 As the EU withdrew GSP preferences from Myanmar/Burma in 1997 and reinstated for application 
from June 13, 2012, we exclude Myanmar from the EBA beneficiaries. 
7 For details, see Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1063/2010 of 18 November 2010 amending 
Regulation (EEC) No. 2454/93 laying down provisions for the implementation of Council Regulation 
(EEC) No. 2913/92 establishing the Community Customs Code. 
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competitively priced fabric imported from third markets. Thus, the ROO were substantially 
relaxed for IEPA beneficiaries after 2008 and EBA beneficiaries after 2011.8 
Table 2 summarizes the origin requirements for garment products in HS chapters 61 and 62 
under the EBA and IEPA regimes. In the previous ROO, exporters could use inputs from the EU 
as originating content under bilateral cumulation rules. Meanwhile, the EBA regime stipulates 
diagonal regional cumulation rules in which inputs from the regional group can be originating 
content, provided that (i) value added in the final stage exceeds the highest customs value of any 
input from other countries, and (ii) the originating inputs are manufactured in these countries. On 
the other hand, the Cotonou Agreement specifies full cumulation rules in which inputs from other 
ACP countries can be originating content. There is no requirement on the final-stage value added 
relative to the customs value of inputs used. The rules of partial cumulation allow for inputs from 
South Africa and neighboring non-ACP countries under the requirement on the final-stage value 
added. 
---Table 2 here--- 
Tolerance rules allow for non-originating inputs up to a total value of 10 percent of the ex-
works price of the product in the EBA regime and 15 percent of that in the Cotonou Agreement. 
Taken together, the previous ROO have different scopes of cumulation and tolerance rules. By 
definition, the origin requirements are more liberal in the Cotonou Agreement than in the previous 
EU GSP. 
 
3. Empirical framework 
3.1.  Theoretical background 
To analyze ROO effects, a starting point is to distinguish between binding and non-binding 
ROO for garment manufacture in the pre-reform period. First, the previous ROO may be non-
binding for garment producers in a beneficiary country to obtain duty-free access. For instance, a 
competitive domestic industry supplies intermediate inputs, so that garment manufacturers need 
not rely heavily on imported inputs. Even if the domestic input supply is limited, they may source 
competitively priced inputs from member countries under cumulation rules, thereby satisfying the 
ROO. Thus, ROO changes should have little impact on exports in beneficiary countries. 
Second, the previous ROO may be binding on garment manufacturers to obtain preferential 
access. As explained in Krishna (2006), any restriction on the choice of inputs may prevent 
exporters from using the best mix of inputs. The unit cost of production may therefore increase 
with the restrictiveness of the origin requirements. Additionally, exporters must obtain a 
certificate of origin to prove the origin of their products. This procedure involves documentation 
                                                   
8 In HS chapter 62, some product categories such as handkerchiefs, shawls, and scarves remained to 
require weaving accompanied by making-up for originating status. 
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of sourcing to keep track of the origin of inputs and their usage. As the documentation tasks may 
necessitate the introduction of a new accounting system, certification procedures also increase 
production costs. Thus, simplifying ROO can promote garment exports through a better mix of 
inputs and a reduction in production costs. 
The decision to obtain preferential treatment depends not only on the costs of meeting ROO, 
but on the margin of preference for export products, i.e., the absolute difference between the most-
favored-nation (MFN) rate of import duty and the preferential rate of import duty.9 As analyzed 
in Demidova et al. (2012), exporters may choose not to use preferential access, but rather pay the 
MFN tariff. If the costs of meeting ROO exceed the benefit of the preferential margin, they would 
choose to pay the MFN tariff when exporting. Thus, simplifying ROO may induce a higher 
fraction of potential exporters to use preferential access and promote aggregate exports. 
 
3.2.  Empirical specification 
To estimate the impact of simplifying ROO on garment exports, we specify an empirical 
model for export market i, import market j, export product p, and year t: 
ln𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼1𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝑌𝑌�𝑖𝑖 + 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (1) 
where ln𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  is the log of export values in product p from export market i to import market j in 
year t. This specification allows us to examine an overall change in exports at the extensive and 
intensive margin. 𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 is a set of export market i belonging to the IEPA beneficiaries. 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 is a 
set of export market i belonging to the EBA beneficiaries. If the EBA beneficiary countries 
initialed the IEPA, they are classified into the set of 𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 and thus excluded from the set of 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖. 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 is a set of import market j with the EU membership during the sample period. 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 is a set of 
garment product p for which product-specific origin requirements are relaxed. 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖  and 𝑌𝑌�𝑖𝑖  are 
dummy variables that take on unity after 2008 and 2011, respectively. We include the following 
interactive fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity in exports; 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 controls for 
time-invariant heterogeneity in overall exports of any product from any export market to any 
import market, and 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  controls for overall exports of any product to any import market in any 
year. Finally, 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  is an error term. 
The coefficients of interest are 𝛼𝛼1 and 𝛽𝛽1 to measure the overall net impact of ROO 
changes on garment exports. We hypothesize that the previous ROO constrained the optimal 
choice of inputs for garment exports in beneficiaries. Simplifying ROO would strengthen the 
competitiveness of beneficiaries’ garment production for competitively priced inputs imported 
from third markets. As we predict that beneficiaries should increase their garment exports to the 
EU market, 𝛼𝛼1 and 𝛽𝛽1 should be positive in sign. We measure the ROO impacts by exploiting 
                                                   
9 As the average tariff rates on clothing products in the EU are 12%, the duty-free access implies the 
preferential margin of 12%. 
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four sources of variations in exports; (i) a difference between beneficiary and non-beneficiary 
exporters; (ii) a difference between EU importers and non-EU importers; (iii) a difference 
between treated garment products and untreated products, and (ⅳ) a difference between pre- and 
post-periods. 
It is useful to clarify what variations in exports are picked up by the coefficients, 𝛼𝛼1 and 
𝛽𝛽1. In the regression model, these coefficients should pick up variations in garment exports across 
exporters over time, which reflect heterogeneity in the initial level of garment exports across 
exporters as well as their new supply response during the sample period. Since we include an 
exporter-importer-product-level fixed effect, 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , to control for the initial level of product-
specific exports in any exporters, 𝛼𝛼1 and 𝛽𝛽1 should pick up the new supply response of garment 
exports to ROO changes. In this respect, we exploit variations in garment exports across exporters 
over time for identification, which makes it difficult to include time-varying exporter-level fixed 
effects. We check this concern by including time-varying exporter characteristics. 
Finally, we discuss the choice of untreated products. Control products should be as similar 
to garment products as possible, but should not be affected by ROO changes in the EU trade 
preferences. In this respect, appropriate control products should exhibit similar labor-intensive 
consumption products, including footwear, headgear, umbrella, and so on. We summarize these 
controls in next section. Meanwhile, we exclude yarn and textiles from the control products. As 
analyzed in Ju and Krishna (2005), the level of ROO can affect profits for both intermediate input 
and final good producers, suggesting that the treatment status of garment exports in beneficiary 
countries may affect a trade pattern of intermediate inputs for garments. Since we implicitly 
assume no interference between treated and untreated exports, these interactive effects may 
violate the assumption and make it sensible to exclude these products from the analysis. 
 
3.3.  Data description 
Export data come from the UN Comtrade Database. We use trade data reported by importers 
for the period 2005-2015. As the sample period starts after the termination of the Multi Fibre 
Agreement regime in 2004, quotas on global garment trade were generally removed. Data on 
Taiwan come from the Trade Statistics Search by the Taiwanese Ministry of Finance. Appendix 
Table 1 reports a list of sample economies. We use the aggregate value of exports at the HS chapter 
level because we examine the origin-rules liberalization on knitted and woven garments in HS 
chapter 61 and 62. 
Data on untreated control products come from HS chapters 63-67. Chapter 63 includes 
blankets, bed line, curtains, furnishing articles, sacks, tarpaulins, worn clothing, worn textiles, 
and rags. Chapters 64 and 65 include footwear and headgear, respectively. Chapter 66 includes 
umbrellas and walking sticks. Chapter 67 covers skin of birds with feather or down, feathers, 
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artificial flowers, human hair, and wigs. Chapter rules of origin requirements for these products 
in the EPA and GSP regimes generally require that all the materials used in the final product are 
classified within a heading other than that of the final product. Thus, their chapter rules remain 
unchanged during the study period. 
 
4. Estimation results 
4.1.  Benchmark results 
Table 3 shows summary statistics for the main sample. The sample includes 199 exporters 
and 180 importers for products in HS chapters 61-67 during the period 2005-2015.10 Table 4 
presents the benchmark results, with standard errors corrected for clustering in exporter-importer 
pairs. Column (1) shows that the coefficient, 𝛼𝛼1, is not statistically significant. We do not find 
evidence that IEPA beneficiaries would increase their garment exports to the EU market after 
ROO liberalization. Meanwhile, the coefficient, 𝛽𝛽1 , is significant and positive, implying that 
EBA beneficiaries increased their garment exports to the EU market by 25% after 2011.11 From 
a theoretical point of view, these varying impacts should depend partly on whether the previous 
ROO were binding on beneficiary exporters. Specifically, the IEPA beneficiaries might not be 
seriously constrained under the previous ROO because of full cumulation rules in the Cotonou 
Agreement. Meanwhile, diagonal regional cumulation rules in the EBA regime are generally more 
restrictive than full cumulation rules. If the EBA beneficiaries might be constrained by the 
previous ROO, simplifying ROO would help to expand garment exports. 
---Tables 3 and 4 here--- 
In column (2), we distinguish between knitted and woven garments. The coefficient, 𝛼𝛼1, is 
not significant for knitted garments under the IEPA trade regime, whereas it is significant and 
positive for woven garments. This implies that simplifying ROO increased only woven garment 
exports in IEPA beneficiaries. This result is partly due to the difference of production technology 
between knit and woven fabric, where knit fabric production is less capital intensive (Curran and 
Nadvi 2015). For instance, relatively loose ROO imply that garment factories in Madagascar, an 
IEPA beneficiary, can use knit fabric made in Mauritius to produce knitted garments and still 
maintain preferential access to the EU market.12 Meanwhile, more capital-intensive production 
of woven fabric tends to concentrate in foreign markets such as China. Since an input choice may 
                                                   
10 We remove fixed effects groups with only a single observation to address a concern of artificially 
low standard errors due to an overstated number of clusters (Correia, 2015). 
11 These results are robust to the inclusion of time-varying exporter characteristics such as GDP, GDP 
per capita, the days of starting a business, domestic credit index, and port infrastructure index. 
Appendix Table 2 presents the estimation results. 
12 The garment industry in Mauritius concentrated on knitted garment products and became a major 
exporter in the 1980s and early1990s (World Bank, 1992). Garment factories in Madagascar continued 
to source knit fabric mainly from Mauritius even after the enactment of IEPA with simple ROO. 
12 
 
be more binding for woven garments, simple ROO allow woven garment manufacturers in 
Madagascar to use more imported woven fabric and increase exports under preferential access. 
Additionally, country-specific factors can partly explain the insignificant effect on knitted 
garments; for instance, most IEPA countries had a small volume of knit garment production, 
whereas two large garment exporters, namely Mauritius and Madagascar, suffered from 
macroeconomic and political conflicts during the study period. Finally, the coefficient, 𝛽𝛽1 , is 
significant and positive for both knitted and woven garment exports in EBA beneficiaries. There 
is no significant difference in the supply response between knitted and woven garments. 
While the results show the positive ROO effects at least for some beneficiary exporters, the 
use of competitively priced inputs from third markets is a key theoretical mechanism to explain 
the positive response. To support this point, we briefly discuss evidence from Cambodia and 
Bangladesh. These countries are major garment exporters for the EU market and increased their 
garment exports under duty-free access.13 In the case of Cambodia, the garment industry relied 
importantly on imported textiles because local textile production did not provide competitive 
inputs for modern garment manufacture (Asuyama and Neou 2014; Natsuda et al., 2010). After 
the EU’s reform in ROO for 2011, Cambodia significantly increased textile imports from China, 
which has competitive textile industries (Tanaka, 2021). 
We can find similar evidence from Bangladesh. In the previous ROO of the EU GSP, garment 
manufacturers could use imported textiles from third markets in the South Asian Association for 
Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and still maintain preferential treatment under rules of 
cumulation.14 However, imported textiles from China were not considered as originating content. 
After the EU’s reform in ROO for 2011, Bangladesh increased textile imports from China 
substantially.15 Thus, competitive textile inputs from third markets play a key role in the supply 
response of these exporters to simplifying ROO. 
 
4.2.  The Timing of the effects 
The benchmark results measure the accumulated effect of simple ROO during the post period. 
To measure the timing of the effect, we include interaction terms for the variables 𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 
and 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 with year dummy variables in equation (1), respectively. In Table 5, column 
(1) shows that 𝛼𝛼1 is not significant for any interaction term with year dummies. The aggregate 
impact on garment exports was not positive for IEPA beneficiaries in any year after 2008. 
Meanwhile, 𝛽𝛽1 is not significant for year 2011, but significant and positive for years 2013, 2014, 
and 2015; the estimated coefficients increase in size over time. The coefficients show that garment 
                                                   
13 Appendix Figures 1 and 2 show garment imports in the EU from Cambodia and Bangladesh, 
respectively. 
14 They include Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. 
15 Appendix Figure 3 shows fabric imports in Bangladesh. 
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exports increased by 26% for 2013 and by 51% for 2015. This implies that the immediate impact 
of simplifying ROO should be small for garment exporters in EBA beneficiaries, who responded 
gradually to the policy change in the EBA regime. 
---Table 5 here--- 
Column (2) reports the timing effects separately for knitted and woven garments by 
interacting the variables 𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 and 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 with dummy variables for knitted and 
woven garment products. 𝛼𝛼1 is not significant or only weakly significant for knitted garment 
exports in IEPA beneficiaries, whereas it is significant and positive for woven garment exports 
for most years after 2008. Consistent with the benchmark results, woven garment exports tend to 
increase significantly at least for some years after 2008. 𝛽𝛽1  is not significant for a year 
immediately after simplifying ROO, but it is significant and positive in a few years after 2011. 
The positive impact of ROO changes on garment exports increased gradually over time. 
These results also shed light on the potential endogeneity of ROO changes in trade 
preferences. A concern is that the positive coefficients might be driven by political lobbying by 
IEPA and EBA beneficiaries to influence EU trade preferences for export promotion. For instance, 
a growth of garment exports during a pre-event period intensified their political influences in EU 
trade preferences, and the timing of ROO changes could coincide with an increasing trend in their 
garment exports to the EU. This interpretation predicts that the coefficients of the variables 𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 ∙
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖  and 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖  with year dummies should be significantly positive for IEPA 
beneficiaries immediately after 2008 and for EBA beneficiaries immediately after 2011. However, 
the results in Table 5 are not consistent with this prediction. Additionally, we check whether their 
garment exports to the EU were increasing during a pre-event period by including 𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 
with year dummies for 2005-2007 and 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 with year dummies for 2008-2010 in the 
same specification. The unreported result shows that there are no significantly positive 
coefficients. Taken together, the endogeneity of ROO changes is not likely to drive our results. 
 
4.3.  Heterogeneous effects across exporters 
To assess whether previous results may mask heterogeneous effects across exporters, we 
disaggregate beneficiary exporters in the interaction variables, 𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 and 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 ∙
𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝑌𝑌�𝑖𝑖 . Specifically, we estimate the region-specific effects for the following group: East African 
IEPA, South African IEPA, Caribbean IEPA, other IEPA, Asian EBA, African EBA, and Pacific 
EBA. 16  The corresponding coefficients, 𝛼𝛼1  and 𝛽𝛽1 , measure the average impact of ROO 
liberalization on garment exports in each group during the post-reform period. 
In Table 6, column (1) shows that the coefficient 𝛼𝛼1 is significant and positive for the East 
African IEPA group including Mauritius and Madagascar, but significant and negative for the 
                                                   
16 Other IEPA includes Côte d’Ivoire, Cameroon, Fiji, Ghana, and Papua New Guinea. 
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Southern African IEPA group. The coefficients are not significant for the Caribbean and other 
IEPA groups. The coefficients indicate that garment exports to the EU increased by 42% after 
2008 for the East African IEPA group, and decreased by 50% for the Southern African IEPA group. 
The insignificant overall effect on IEPA exporters can be due to heterogeneous impacts across 
IEPA exporters. Additionally, 𝛽𝛽1 is significant and positive for the Asian EBA group, implying 
that their garment exports to the EU increased by 90% after 2011. While the coefficient is not 
significant for the African EBA group, it is significant and negative for the Pacific EBA group. 
Thus, the positive overall effect on EBA exporters should be due to Asian EBA countries. 
---Table 6 here--- 
Since product heterogeneity may also mask regional effects, we distinguish between knitted 
and woven garments. Column (2) reports the results of separate regional effects for knitted and 
woven exports. In the case of knitted garments, 𝛼𝛼1 is significant and negative for the Southern 
African IEPA group, whereas 𝛽𝛽1 remains significant and positive for the Asian EBA group. Only 
Asian EBA exporters increased knitted garment exports to the EU significantly after 2011. In the 
case of woven garments, the coefficients are significant and positive for the East African IEPA, 
Caribbean IEPA, and Asian EBA groups. By contrast, the coefficients are significant and negative 
for the Southern African IEPA and Pacific EBA groups. Thus, the regional effects are more 
heterogeneous for woven garments than for knitted garments. 
We turn to evaluate the ROO impacts on individual exporters by disaggregating the 
interaction variables, namely, 𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 and 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝑌𝑌�𝑖𝑖 , for each beneficiary. In 
this specification, 𝛼𝛼1 and 𝛽𝛽1 measure the exporter-specific effects of ROO on both knitted and 
woven garments. Appendix Table 3 shows a large dispersion of the estimated coefficients, 
suggesting substantially varying supply responses to simple ROO across exporters. Among IEPA 
exporters, we find significantly positive impacts for countries such as Haiti, Mozambique, Kenya, 
Madagascar, and the Dominican Republic. In the case of EBA exporters, we find significantly 
positive effects for Cambodia, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Laos, and Nepal. 
To allow for varying impacts between knitted and woven garments, we estimate the exporter-
specific effects separately for knitted and woven garments. For brevity, we plot the estimated 
coefficients in Figure 1, with each marker indicating an exporting market. The vertical and 
horizontal axes show the estimated coefficients of exporter-specific effects for knitted and woven 
garment exports, respectively. It is evident that the positive impacts are limited to a handful of 
successful exporters. Taken together, we highlight that the supply response to simple ROO is 
heterogeneous across beneficiary exporters. 
---Figure 1 here--- 
4.4.  Robustness check 
While we demonstrate the heterogeneous impacts of ROO changes across beneficiary 
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exporters, there remains an econometric problem of heteroscedasticity and the presence of zero 
export flows (Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006). Since the standard OLS estimator may be biased 
in the presence of heteroscedasticity in exports, a solution is to use PPML estimation. To examine 
whether the heterogeneous impacts of ROO changes are robust to this issue, we implement PPML 
estimation of regression models in Table 6. 
 Table 7 presents the PPML results for the sample with zero exports.17 Column (1) shows 
that the coefficients remain unchanged qualitatively not only for the Southern African, the 
Caribbean and other IEPA groups, but for the Asian and Pacific EBA groups. The results for these 
groups are generally unchanged. A key difference is that the coefficients are significantly negative 
for the East African IEPA group and significantly positive for the African EBA group. To 
investigate the potential role of product heterogeneity in these results, column (2) presents the 
coefficients separately for knitted and woven garments. For the East Africa IEPA group, the 
coefficient for knitted garments becomes significantly negative, whereas the coefficient for woven 
garments become insignificant. For the Africa EBA group, the coefficient for knitted garments 
becomes significantly positive. Taken together, the PPML estimation highlights the heterogeneous 
impacts of ROO changes on exports across beneficiary exporters, and the estimated impacts may 
be sensitive for some African exporters. 
---Table 7 here--- 
 
5. Discussions 
Discussions up to this point have demonstrated heterogeneous supply responses to 
simplifying ROO across beneficiary exporters. However, there remains the key question of what 
underlying conditions can explain the heterogeneous responses across beneficiary exporters. This 
section provides alternative explanations with some country cases. 
 
5.1.  Garment Production Base 
We start to highlight the initial production base for garment exports. Figure 2 presents a 
relationship between exporter-specific ROO impacts and the value of garment exports to the EU 
or U.S. markets in 2005. The estimated impacts of ROO liberalization correlate positively not 
only with the initial level of EU-bound exports in 2005, but with the initial level of U.S.-bound 
exports in 2005.18 If beneficiary countries had the substantial value of EU-bound exports in 2005, 
they tend to experience a large increase in their exports subsequently. Additionally, the impacts 
are positive for countries such as the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Kenya, which exhibited a 
                                                   
17 To implement PPML estimation with high dimensional fixed effects, we adopt estimation approach 
by Correia et al. (2019), i.e., ppmlhdfe in STATA command. 
18 Frazer and Van Biesebroeck (2010) also show a positive relationship between the export response 
to the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and the country’s initial level of exports. 
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large value of U.S.-bound exports. While there are a few exceptions such as Mauritius, Lesotho 
and Swaziland, simplifying ROO appears to exhibit a more pronounced impact on beneficiaries 
with the large existing capacity of garment production during the pre-period. 
---Figure 2 here--- 
From the supply side, a large production base suggests that agglomeration effects in export-
oriented garment industry can promote export growth in low-income countries. A cluster of 
export-oriented firms improves industrial productivity through access to inputs, a pooling of 
workers, and information sharing (Murakami and Otsuka, 2020). An industrial cluster helps to 
improve business environments through government supports in investment and custom policies. 
This observation is consistent with the growth of footwear exports in the south of Brazil, as 
Schmitz (1995) highlights that a cluster of shoe manufacturers strengthens the capacity to seize 
an export opportunity through collective efforts in industrial production. 
From the demand side, a large production base reflects the existence of garment exporters 
that can satisfy stringent criteria by international buyers. For instance, Gereffi and Frederick 
(2010) suggest that buyers were likely to maintain a short-term relationship with garment factories 
providing only assembly services before the global financial crisis in the late 2000s. Subsequently, 
a relationship between buyers and garment factories became longer and more stable, so that 
buyers can manage garment factories to improve production efficiency, including reductions in 
lead times and costs, as well as higher quality. A concentration of these garment factories imply 
that some countries can build up an extensive buyer-supplier network and high production 
capability. Simplifying ROO can benefit these countries more strongly through the buyer-supplier 
relationship. 
 
5.2.  Investment Climate 
An effective policy for investment climate can boost a supply response of beneficiary 
exporters. For instance, garment exports to the EU from Ethiopia increased sharply after 
simplifying ROO in the EU GSP.19 This is partly due to previous industrial policies to improve 
the investment climate for garment production. Specifically, the Ethiopian government identified 
the textile and garment industries as a priority sector in its industrial development strategy in 2002, 
and provided investors with preferential land access under government controls. Together with 
export incentives, the government made a large investment in skill upgrading through the 
establishment of a public technical institute for the garment industry and vocational training 
institutes in secondary and higher education. In the 2010s, the Ethiopian government established 
large industrial parks for the textile and garment industries to provide services in customs 
clearance, licensing, and immigration. Under these supportive policies, for instance, Turkish 
                                                   
19 Appendix Figure 4 shows garment imports in EU from Ethiopia. 
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textile firms made a first large investment in the Ethiopian garment industry in 2008, and a major 
European retailor opened a sourcing office in 2012 (Staritz and Whitfield, 2017). 
 
5.3.  Structural Transformation 
Structural transformation in an economy can affect supply responses. For instance, Mauritius 
experienced high growth of garment production in the early 1980s, but EU-bound garment exports 
have tended to decline since the early 2000s.20 The reason is that a shortage of labor supply and 
a rise of wages in the small island economy posed a constraint to the expansion of domestic 
garment production (Subramanian and Roy, 2003). Garment manufactures had a strong incentive 
to locate labor-intensive garment production in a low-wage country such as Madagascar, thereby 
reducing garment production. Because the Mauritian economy was in the midst of structural 
transformation from labor-intensive manufacturing to service industries during the 2000s, 
Mauritius did not exhibit pronounced growth in garment exports even after simplifying ROO 
under the IEPA regime. 
 
5.4.  Economic Shocks 
Economic shocks in beneficiary countries can suppress supply responses. In Madagascar, a 
political crisis occurred in 2009 when the army attacked the president and replaced him without 
an election. The international community including the Africa Union called the regime change 
anti-democratic, and many donor countries suspended aid to Madagascar. Although preferential 
access under the IEPA was unchanged, the Madagascar economy went into recession and garment 
exports to the EU decreased substantially in 2009 and 2010. However, armed conflicts under the 
transitional regime were infrequent, and garment exports to the EU started to recover after 2011. 
Economic shocks also depress export opportunities. In the 1990s, Zimbabwe had larger and 
more diversified manufacturing industries than other sub-Saharan African countries, and textiles 
were key export products to the EU market (Hoogeveen and Mumvuma 2002). However, the 
economic crisis in the 2000s seriously hurt the national economy and the garment industry. Under 
hyperinflation, exporting firms were plagued by overvalued exchange rates, a shortage of foreign 
currency, an unstable power supply, and a lack of finance and materials (Dube and Chipumho 
2016). When the IEPA regime started, the inflation rate was at its peak and many firms stopped 
operation. As garment exports to the EU continued to fall during the 2000s, ROO liberalization 




                                                   




Preferential market access to developed economies can promote an export industry in 
developing economies. Since stringent ROO may discourage trade flows from beneficiaries, 
liberal ROO are key to export performance. However, it remains unexplored whether ROO 
impacts are heterogeneous across exporters. This paper examines the impact of ROO 
liberalization on garment exports in developing economies. Specifically, we focus on the IEPA 
and EBA trade regimes in EU trade preferences. For garment products, duty-free and quota-free 
market access were unchanged, but origin requirements were relaxed from a two-stage 
transformation to a one-stage transformation. Using a dataset on global trade flows during the 
period 2005-2015, we estimate the impact of simplifying ROO on garment exports in IEPA and 
EBA beneficiaries. 
We find that simplifying ROO has little overall net effect on garment exports for IEPA 
beneficiaries, but a significantly positive impact for EBA beneficiaries. A theoretical 
interpretation is that the previous ROO for IEPA beneficiaries might not seriously constrain 
exporters in input sourcing, whereas garment exporters in EBA beneficiaries might have faced 
more restrictive ROO than those in IEPA beneficiaries. Additionally, we find the heterogeneous 
ROO impacts across exporters. Only some beneficiaries in Africa and Asia increased garment 
exports to the EU significantly. As a key underlying condition for export performance, we 
highlight dependence on competitively priced inputs from third markets, the initial production 
base for garment exports, investment climate, structural transformation, and political and 
economic shocks. These country-specific factors help to shed light on the heterogeneous ROO 
impacts among EBA and IEPA beneficiaries. 
We conclude by discussing unexplored questions. First, further research is needed to identify 
key domestic policies for successful export performance in low-income countries. This research 
can shed light on key bottlenecks for export promotion in unsuccessful African and Asian 
countries. Second, a key question is the welfare impact of simplifying ROO in trade preferences, 
as ROO impacts involve not only complex value chains in a globalized economy, but consumer 
benefits in preference-giving countries. Finally, another key question is to explore potential 
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Figure 1. Exporter-specific Impacts of ROO Liberalization 
 
Notes: The horizontal axis shows the estimated coefficients of exporter-specific effects for woven 
garment exports; the vertical axis indicates the estimated coefficients of exporter-specific effects 
for knitted garment exports; each plot shows data on exporting markets; the circle marker shows 
the significant coefficients for both knitted and woven garments; the triangle marker shows the 
significant coefficients only for knitted garments; the diamond marker shows the significant 
coefficients only for woven garments. 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on UN Comtrade
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Figure 2. Exporter-specific ROO Impacts and Initial Export Levels 
 
Notes: Exporter-specific coefficients come from the estimation results in Appendix Table 3; 
exports include knitted and woven garment products in HS chapters 61 and 62; circle markers 
indicate a p-value of less than or equal to 0.1 for the corresponding estimated coefficient; the lines 
represent the predicted values from a linear regression of the exporter-specific coefficients on the 
log export values in 2005 for the EU and US markets. 





Table 1. List of Interim EPA Signatory Countries and EBA Beneficiaries 
Country IEPA EBA Country IEPA EBA 
Asia Pacific 
Afghanistan N Y East Timor N Y 
Bangladesh N Y Fiji Y N 
Bhutan N Y Kiribati N Y 
Cambodia N Y Papua New Guinea Y N 
Laos N Y Samoa N Y 
Myanmar N Y Solomon Islands N Y 
Nepal N Y Tuvalu N Y 
Timor-Leste N Y Vanuatu N Y 
Yemen N Y    
Caribbean East Africa 
Antigua and Barbuda Y N Burundi Y Y 
Bahamas Y N Comoros Y Y 
Barbados Y N Djibouti N Y 
Belize Y N Eritrea N Y 
Dominica Y N Ethiopia N Y 
Dominican Republic Y N Kenya Y N 
Grenada Y N Madagascar Y Y 
Guyana Y N Mauritius Y N 
Haiti Y Y Rwanda Y Y 
Jamaica Y N Seychelles Y N 
Saint Kitts and Nevis Y N Somalia N Y 
Saint Vincent & the Grenadines Y N Sudan N Y 
Santa-Lucia Y N South Sudan N Y 
Suriname Y N Tanzania Y Y 
Trinidad and Tobago Y N Uganda Y Y 
Central Africa West Africaa 
Cameroon Y N Benin Y Y 
Central African Republic N Y Burkina-Faso Y Y 
Chad N Y Côte d'Ivoire Y N 
Dem. Rep. of the Congo N Y Cape-Verde Y Nb 
Equatorial Guinea N Y Gambia Y Y 
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Sao Tome & Principe N Y Ghana Y N 
Southern Africa Guinea Y Y 
Angola N Y Guinea-Bissau Y Y 
Botswana Y N Liberia Y Y 
Lesotho Y Y Mali Y Y 
Malawi N Y Mauritania Y Y 
Mozambique Y Y Niger Y Y 
Namibia Y N Nigeria N N 
Swaziland Y N Senegal Y Y 
Zambia Y Y Sierra Leone Y Y 
Zimbabwe Y N Togo Y Y 
Notes: IEPA (interim EPA) indicates that the IEPA signatory states except for West Africa 
could export to the EU under the IEPA regime since January 2008; EBA indicates the EBA 
beneficiary country as of August 2015; GSP preferences were withdrawn from 
Myanmar/Burma in 1997 and reinstated for application from June 13, 2012; South Sudan 
became a beneficiary in 2013; (a) the interim EPA was signed in December 2014 by West 
African countries, except Nigeria, Mauritania (signed on September 21, 2018), and Gambia 
(signed on August 9, 2018); (b) EBA status was granted to Cape-Verde until 2011. 





Table 2. EU's Rules of Origin for Knitted and Woven Garments 
Products: HS chapters 61 and 62 
Panel A: Origin Requirements under Interim EPA Regime 
 Old Rulesa New Rules 
Periods to apply new rules 1st January 2008b 
Processing stages Double transformation Single transformation 
 Manufacture from yarn Manufacture from fabric 
Scope of cumulation   
 Bilateral cumulation Inputs from the European Union can be originating content 
in the ACP countries. 
 
Full cumulation Inputs from other ACP countries can be originating content 
under the Cotonou Agreement; no requirement on the final-
stage value added relative to the customs value of inputs 
used. 
 
Partial cumulation Inputs from South Africa and neighboring non-ACP 
countries can be originating content, provided that the final-
stage value added exceeds the value of inputs from these 
countries. 
Tolerance rule Non-originating inputs up to a total value of 15 percent of 
the ex-works price of the product can be used. 
Panel B: Origin Requirements under EBA Regime 
 Old Rules New Rules 
Periods to apply new rules 1st January 2011 
Processing stages Double transformation Single transformation 
 Manufacture from yarn Manufacture from fabric 
Scope of cumulation   




Inputs from countries in the regional grouping (ASEAN, 
SAARC, Andean Group, and CACM) can be originating 
content, provided that (i) value added in the final stage 
exceeds the highest customs value of any of inputs used 
from other countries; (ii) the originating inputs are 
manufactured in these countries.  
Tolerance rule Non-originating inputs up to a total value of 10 percent of 
the ex-works price of the product can be used. 
Notes: (a) “Old rules” refers to the rules of origin under the Cotonou Agreements; (b) West 
African countries and the EU concluded the negotiations for an EPA in February 2014. 






Table 3. Summary Statistics 
Variable 






Log export 612,856 10.24 3.67 0 23.6 
IEPA × EU × Garment × Post2008 612,856 0.008 0.088 0 1 
IEPA × EU × Knitted Garment × Post2008 612,856 0.004 0.063 0 1 
IEPA × EU × Woven Garment × Post2008 612,856 0.004 0.062 0 1 
EBA × EU × Garment × Post2011 612,856 0.004 0.065 0 1 
EBA × EU × Knitted Garment × Post2011 612,856 0.002 0.046 0 1 





Table 4. Benchmark Results 
Dependent variable: log of exports 
  (1) (2) 
IEPA × EU × Garment × Post2008 0.030  
 (0.086)  
IEPA × EU × Knitted Garment × Post2008  -0.16 
  (0.10) 
IEPA × EU × Woven Garment × Post2008  0.24* 
  (0.11) 
EBA × EU × Garment × Post2011 0.22**  
 (0.081)  
EBA × EU × Knitted Garment × Post2011  0.22* 
  (0.10) 
EBA × EU × Woven Garment × Post2011  0.21* 
  (0.089) 
Exporter-importer-product fixed effects Y Y 
Importer-product-year fixed effects Y Y 
No. of observations 612,856 612,856 
R-squared 0.87 0.87 
Notes: IEPA and EBA indicate that exporters are IEPA signatory and EBA beneficiary 
countries, respectively: garment exports include knitted and woven garment products in HS 
chapters 61 and 62; parentheses report standard errors corrected for clustering in exporter-
importer pairs; constant is not reported; **, *, and + denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 





Table 5. Results of Timing Effects 
Dependent variable: log of exports 
  (1) (2) 
 Knitted & Woven Garments Knitted Garments Woven Garments 
  Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
IEPA × EU × Garment × Year 2008 -0.016 (0.085) 0.029 (0.12) -0.042 (0.11) 
IEPA × EU × Garment × Year 2009 0.13 (0.10) 0.0041 (0.14) 0.27* (0.12) 
IEPA × EU × Garment × Year 2010 -0.044 (0.10) -0.15 (0.13) 0.084 (0.14) 
IEPA × EU × Garment × Year 2011 0.015 (0.11) -0.27+ (0.15) 0.32* (0.14) 
IEPA × EU × Garment × Year 2012 0.023 (0.12) -0.27+ (0.14) 0.34* (0.15) 
IEPA × EU × Garment × Year 2013 0.034 (0.12) -0.27+ (0.15) 0.36* (0.16) 
IEPA × EU × Garment × Year 2014 -0.014 (0.14) -0.24 (0.16) 0.23 (0.18) 
IEPA × EU × Garment × Year 2015 0.12 (0.13) -0.16 (0.16) 0.42* (0.17) 
EBA × EU × Garment × Year 2011 -0.0061 (0.093) -0.051 (0.13) 0.039 (0.11) 
EBA × EU × Garment × Year 2012 0.15 (0.095) 0.16 (0.12) 0.14 (0.12) 
EBA × EU × Garment × Year 2013 0.23* (0.11) 0.21 (0.15) 0.25* (0.12) 
EBA × EU × Garment × Year 2014 0.29** (0.11) 0.23+ (0.13) 0.34** (0.12) 
EBA × EU × Garment × Year 2015 0.41** (0.12) 0.44** (0.14) 0.37** (0.13) 
Exporter-importer-product fixed effects Y Y 
Importer-product-year fixed effects Y Y 
No. of observations 612,856 612,856 
R-squared 0.87 0.87 
Notes: IEPA and EBA indicate that exporters are IEPA signatory and EBA beneficiary countries, respectively; garment exports include knitted 
and woven garment products in HS chapters 61 and 62; parentheses report standard errors corrected for clustering in exporter-importer pairs; 





Table 6. Results of Regional Effects 
Dependent variable: log of exports 
  (1) (2) 
 Knitted & Woven Garments Knitted Garments Woven Garments 
  Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
East African IEPA × EU × Garment × Post2008 0.35* (0.15) 0.080 (0.17) 0.63** (0.18) 
Southern African IEPA × EU × Garment × Post2008 -0.70** (0.20) -0.60* (0.24) -0.81** (0.24) 
Caribbean IEPA × EU × Garment × Post2008 0.097 (0.15) -0.18 (0.18) 0.44* (0.20) 
Other IEPA × EU × Garment × Post2008 -0.019 (0.14) -0.15 (0.20) 0.11 (0.17) 
Asian EBA × EU × Garment × Post2011 0.64** (0.080) 0.63** (0.087) 0.64** (0.11) 
African EBA × EU × Garment × Post2011 -0.21 (0.14) -0.24 (0.20) -0.17 (0.13) 
Pacific EBA × EU × Garment × Post2011 -1.05* (0.48) -0.40 (0.50) -1.79* (0.76) 
Exporter-importer-product fixed effects Y Y 
Importer-product-year fixed effects Y Y 
No. of observations 612,856 612,856 
R-squared 0.87 0.87 
Notes: IEPA and EBA indicate that exporters are IEPA signatory and EBA beneficiary countries, respectively; garment exports include knitted and 
woven garment products in HS chapters 61 and 62; parentheses report standard errors corrected for clustering in exporter-importer pairs; constant 





Table 7. PPML Estimation of Regional Effects 
Dependent variable: value of exports 
  (1) (2) 
 Knitted & Woven Garments Knitted Garments Woven Garments 
  Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
East African IEPA × EU × Garment × Post2008 -0.30** (0.095) -0.39** (0.10) -0.085 (0.19) 
Southern African IEPA × EU × Garment × Post2008 -1.15** (0.26) -1.10* (0.52) -1.20** (0.21) 
Caribbean IEPA × EU × Garment × Post2008 0.14 (0.29) -0.32+ (0.19) 0.89 (0.56) 
Other IEPA × EU × Garment × Post2008 0.16 (0.24) 0.31 (0.36) 0.011 (0.29) 
Asian EBA × EU × Garment × Post2011 0.64** (0.050) 0.52** (0.048) 0.85** (0.061) 
African EBA × EU × Garment × Post2011 1.49* (0.63) 2.13** (0.66) -0.052 (0.19) 
Pacific EBA × EU × Garment × Post2011 -0.98* (0.40) -1.29 (0.83) -0.82* (0.35) 
Exporter-importer-product fixed effects Y Y 
Importer-product-year fixed effects Y Y 
No. of observations 1,119,708 1,119,708 
Pseudo-R-squared 0.99 0.99 
Notes: IEPA and EBA indicate that exporters are IEPA signatory and EBA beneficiary countries, respectively; garment exports include knitted and 
woven garment products in HS chapters 61 and 62; parentheses report standard errors corrected for clustering in exporter-importer pairs; constant 




Supplemental Online Appendix 
 
Appendix Figure 1. Garment Imports in the EU from Cambodia 
 
Notes: The value of garment imports in the EU markets is disaggregated by market access (under 
duty-free or MFN rates) and garment product (knitted or woven); the red vertical line shows the 




Appendix Figure 2. Garment Imports in the EU from Bangladesh 
 
Notes: The value of garment imports in the EU markets is disaggregated by market access (under 
duty-free or MFN rates) and garment product (knitted or woven); the red vertical line shows the 





Appendix Figure 3. Fabric Imports in Bangladesh 
 
Notes: The value of imports in Bangladesh is taken from export data in HS chapter 60; each 
marker indicates an exporting market; the red vertical line shows the year when the new ROO in 
the EU GSP came into effective. 




Appendix Figure 4. Garment Imports in EU from Ethiopia 
 
Notes: The value of garment imports in the EU markets is disaggregated by market access (under 
duty-free or MFN rates) and garment product (knitted or woven); the red vertical line shows the 




Appendix Figure 5. Garment Imports in EU from Mauritius 
 
Notes: The value of garment imports in the EU markets is disaggregated by market access (under 
duty-free or MFN rates) and garment product (knitted or woven); the red vertical line shows the 






Appendix Table 1. List of Sample Economies 
Afghanistan Dem. Rep. of the Congo Lesotho Samoa 
Albania Denmark Liberia Sao Tome and Principe 
Algeria Djibouti Libya Saudi Arabia 
Andorra Dominica Lithuania Senegal 
Angola Dominican Rep. Luxembourg Serbia 
Anguilla Ecuador Madagascar Serbia and Montenegro 
Antigua and Barbuda Egypt Malawi Seychelles 
Argentina El Salvador Malaysia Sierra Leone 
Armenia Equatorial Guinea Maldives Singapore 
Aruba Eritrea Mali Slovakia 
Australia Estonia Malta Slovenia 
Austria Ethiopia Mauritania Solomon Islands 
Azerbaijan FS Micronesia Mauritius Somalia 
Bahamas Fiji Mexico South Africa 
Bahrain Finland Mongolia South Sudan 
Bangladesh Former Sudan Montenegro Spain 
Barbados France Morocco Sri Lanka 
Belarus Gabon Mozambique Suriname 
Belgium Gambia Myanmar Swaziland 
Benin Georgia Namibia Sweden 
Bermuda Germany Nauru Switzerland 
Bhutan Ghana Nepal Syria 
Bolivia Greece Neth. Antilles TFYR of Macedonia 
Bosnia Herzegovina Grenada Netherlands Taiwan 
Botswana Guatemala New Caledonia Tajikistan 
Brazil Guinea New Zealand Thailand 
Brunei Darussalam Guinea-Bissau Nicaragua Timor-Leste 
Bulgaria Guyana Niger Togo 
Burkina Faso Haiti Nigeria Tonga 
Burundi Honduras Niue Trinidad and Tobago 
Côte d'Ivoire Hungary Norway Tunisia 
Cambodia Iceland Oman Turkey 
Cameroon India Pakistan Turkmenistan 
Canada Indonesia Palau Tuvalu 
Central African Rep. Iran Panama United States of America 
Chad Iraq Papua New Guinea Uganda 
Chile Ireland Paraguay Ukraine 
China Israel Peru United Arab Emirates 
China, Hong Kong SAR Italy Philippines United Kingdom 
China, Macao SAR Jamaica Poland United Rep. of Tanzania 
Colombia Japan Portugal Uruguay 
Comoros Jordan Qatar Uzbekistan 
Congo Kazakhstan Rep. of Korea Vanuatu 
Cook Islands Kenya Rep. of Moldova Venezuela 
Costa Rica Kiribati Romania Viet Nam 
Croatia Kuwait Russian Federation Yemen 
Cuba Kyrgyzstan Rwanda Zambia 
Cyprus Lao People's Dem. Rep. Saint Kitts and Nevis Zimbabwe 
Czechia Latvia Saint Lucia  
Dem. People's Rep.  
of Korea Lebanon 
Saint Vincent and  





Appendix Table 2. Results of Additional Control Variables  
Dependent variable: log of exports 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
IEPA × EU × Garment × Post2008 0.028 -0.028   
 (0.087) (0.16)   
IEPA × EU × Knitted Garment × 
Post2008 
  -0.17 -0.17 
   (0.10) (0.18) 
IEPA × EU × Woven Garment × 
Post2008 
  0.24* 0.13 
   (0.11) (0.19) 
EBA × EU × Garment × Post2011 0.20* 0.24*   
 (0.081) (0.11)   
EBA × EU × Knitted Garment × 
Post2011 
  0.19+ 0.13 
   (0.10) (0.13) 
EBA × EU × Woven Garment × 
Post2011 
  0.20* 0.35** 
   (0.088) (0.14) 
Log GDP -0.48** -0.61** -0.49** -0.61** 
 (0.099) (0.13) (0.099) (0.13) 
Log GDP per capita 1.03** 1.21** 1.03** 1.21** 
 (0.10) (0.14) (0.10) (0.14) 
Starting time  0.00058  0.00058 
  (0.00037)  (0.00037) 
Credit   -0.00072+  -0.00072+ 
  (0.00044)  (0.00044) 
Port infrastructure  0.19**  0.19** 
  (0.014)  (0.014) 
Exporter-importer-product fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
Importer-product-year fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
No. of observations 596,934 398,939 596,934 398,939 
R-squared 0.88 0.89 0.88 0.89 
39 
 
Notes: IEPA and EBA indicate that exporters are IEPA signatory and EBA beneficiary 
countries, respectively: garment exports include knitted and woven garment products in HS 
chapters 61 and 62; parentheses report standard errors corrected for clustering in exporter-
importer pairs; constant is not reported; **, *, and + denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 




Appendix Table 3. Results of Exporter-specific Impacts for Knitted and Woven 
Garments 
Dependent variable: log of exports 
IEPA Exporter Coef. Std. Err. EBA Exporter Coef. 
Std. 
Err. 
Haiti 1.46** (0.17) Ethiopia 1.90** (0.39) 
Mozambique 1.37* (0.64) Cambodia 1.36** (0.14) 
Kenya 1.26** (0.28) Bangladesh 0.82** (0.13) 
Madagascar 0.69** (0.21) Nepal 0.54** (0.12) 
Dominican Rep. 0.67* (0.28) Lao People's Dem. Rep. 0.25* (0.12) 
United Rep. of Tanzania 0.66 (0.45) Bhutan 0.23 (0.42) 
Grenada 0.59 (0.49) Togo 0.15 (0.37) 
Comoros 0.54 (1.21) Burkina Faso -0.0017 (0.31) 
Uganda 0.50 (0.36) Guinea -0.0083 (0.32) 
Dominica 0.36 (0.39) Dem. Rep. of the Congo -0.045 (0.51) 
Ghana 0.070 (0.21) Yemen -0.18 (0.59) 
Côte d'Ivoire 0.053 (0.34) Central African Rep. -0.29 (0.49) 
Lesotho 0.043 (0.42) Afghanistan -0.32 (0.23) 
Fiji 0.035 (0.35) Tuvalu -0.35 (0.76) 
Seychelles -0.0039 (0.36) Niger -0.39 (0.54) 
Cameroon -0.065 (0.26) Malawi -0.41 (0.48) 
Bahamas -0.24 (0.52) Senegal -0.44 (0.30) 
Swaziland -0.27 (0.36) Kiribati -0.49 (1.36) 
Trinidad and Tobago -0.39 (0.42) Eritrea -0.51 (0.67) 
Mauritius -0.43 (0.31) Sierra Leone -0.52 (0.33) 
Suriname -0.50 (0.44) Angola -0.55 (0.70) 
Saint Lucia -0.61 (0.52) Djibouti -0.55 (0.46) 
Namibia -0.62* (0.30) Benin -0.58 (0.62) 
Papua New Guinea -0.67 (0.50) Mauritania -0.62+ (0.35) 
Antigua and Barbuda -0.74 (0.83) Equatorial Guinea -0.71** (0.26) 
Barbados -0.84* (0.39) Mali -0.76** (0.26) 
Guyana -0.85 (0.99) Solomon Islands -0.78+ (0.44) 
Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines -0.88 (0.93) 
Sao Tome and 
Principe -0.80 (0.95) 
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Rwanda -0.88* (0.42) Somalia -0.81 (0.78) 
Burundi -0.96** (0.36) Former Sudan 
-
1.09** (0.33) 
Botswana -1.03 (0.72) Timor-Leste -1.14 (0.88) 
Saint Kitts and Nevis -1.43* (0.68) Liberia -1.16* (0.59) 
Zambia -1.46** (0.35) Guinea-Bissau -1.28+ (0.66) 
Zimbabwe -1.83** (0.27) Vanuatu -2.03+ (1.10) 
Jamaica -2.02** (0.55) Gambia -2.28 (1.50) 
   Chad -2.83+ (1.45) 
   Samoa -4.87** (0.18) 
Exporter-importer-product fixed effects are included 
Importer-product-year fixed effects are included 
No. of observations 612,856 
R-squared 0.87 
Notes: IEPA and EBA indicate that exporters are IEPA signatory and EBA beneficiary 
countries, respectively; garment exports include knitted and woven garment products in HS 
chapters 61 and 62; parentheses report standard errors corrected for clustering in exporter-
importer pairs; constant is not reported; **, *, and + denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level, respectively. 
 
